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In treatments of Monopolistic Competition, Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson are usually 
credited with simultaneously and independently developing the theory of monopolistic or imper-
fect competition.  While their contributions were indeed simultaneously developed, it is inappro-
priate to treat them as having duplicated each other‟s efforts.  Yet it has become customary in 
many treatments to regard them as having done just that, and modern textbook treatments tend to 
mention the two as if they were interchangeable.  In no respect were they less so than in their 
views of the welfare implications of monopolistic competition.  But the passage of time seems to 
have resulted in a blurring of the distinction between them, and it has become a common practice 
to ascribe to monopolistic competition an incompatibility with Pareto optimality.  An important 
point of focus of this paper is Chamberlin‟s response to the tendency to treat his analysis as indi-
cating a market failure. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he decade of the 1930‘s gave rise to two ―revolutions‖ in economic theory – the Keynesian Revolution 
in macroeconomics, and the Imperfect Competition Revolution in microeconomics.  With develop-
ment of the theory of imperfect competition, recognition is routinely jointly given to Edward Cham-
berlin (1933) and to Joan Robinson (1933).  In modern price theory texts at all levels, and even in texts on the histo-
ry of economic thought, the two contributions are often treated as more or less equivalent.  Even where the differ-
ences between Chamberlain and Robinson have been acknowledged, they are often trivialized as is suggested by this 
quote from Paul Samuelson (1967) in a volume of essays in tribute to the influence of Chamberlin:   
 
Indeed the time has come when we may permit ourselves to use the terms monopolistic competition and im-
perfect competition interchangeably, emancipating them from their first associations with the different conceptions 
of Chamberlin and Mrs. Robinson, using them as convenient names for the best current models of price theory. 
 
Whether the discussion of imperfect or monopolistic competition centers on Chamberlin or Robinson, mo-
nopolistic competition generally is seen as a departure from the ideal of perfect competition that results in a loss of 
economic welfare – that is, a departure from Pareto optimality.  And often, this departure is seen as a type of market 
failure in need of correction through government intervention.  Certainly, this is how Joan Robinson viewed imper-
fect competition, as did the greatest number of their contemporaries who were congenial to their analysis.  But it is a 
serious misinterpretation of Chamberlin‘s own position.   
 
To Chamberlin, the product differentiation that characterizes imperfect competition is not welfare reducing, 
but welfare enhancing.  Stated otherwise, society gets as much product diversity as it is willing to pay for.  But even 
in his own time, his contribution was regarded as demonstrating the inefficiency of monopolistic competition – basi-
cally because the monopolistically competitive firm of his model does not operate at the low point of its long run 
average cost curve.  Indeed, much of the rest of Chamberlin‘s life was spent arguing against this interpretation of his 
work, and differentiating his work from that of Robinson.  But this episode has largely been lost to modern econo-
mists, as evidenced by the perusal of modern texts. 
T 
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 The purpose of this paper will be to elaborate on this episode.  Woven among the sections that follow are 
three objectives of this paper:  Specifically, one objective of this paper is to outline the historical development of the 
influence and criticisms of Chamberlin.  A second objective is to examine Chamberlin‘s attempts to distance himself 
from those who accepted his model but found welfare implications with which Chamberlin strongly disagreed.  A 
third objective is to argue that the historical and still contemporary conclusion about the inefficiency of monopolistic 
competition is more of an indication of the weakness and limitation of static Paretian welfare economics than an 
indication of inefficiency due to less-than-perfectly elastic demand curves facing firms with differentiated products. 
 
2.  Chamberlin vs. Robinson 
 
 Despite the tendency to interpret Chamberlin and Robinson as having simultaneously developed essentially 
the same theory of monopolistic competition, historians of thought have not considered them to be equal giants in 
the field.  A good example is in a comparison of the profiles of the two offered on the History of Thought web 
project of the New School.
1
 Whereas the quite laudatory remarks about Robinson are several pages in length, and 
the fact that she didn‘t receive a Nobel Prize is lamented, the discussion of Chamberlin is of a very different nature.  
The entire Chamberlin description is:   
 
A Harvard economist whose career turned out to be disappointing after a promising start, Edward H. 
Chamberlin turned out to be a man of one idea: „monopolistic competition‟, which he unveiled to the world in 1933, 
coincidentally with Joan Robinson‟s theory of imperfect competition.  Chamberlin spent virtually the rest of his life 
on three tracks:  (1) differentiating his theory from Robinson‟s; (2) defending his theory against the Chicago School 
and other critics; (3) puzzling why his theory had not brought on a revolution in microeconomics.  All these narrow 




 It would of course be very difficult to argue against the judgment that Robinson‘s contributions to econom-
ics have greatly overshadowed those of Chamberlin.  Her contributions have spanned the sub-fields of Keynesian 
Macro-economics, Cambridge Growth and Capital Theory, Distribution Theory, Marxian Economics, and Metho-
dology.  She was certainly the more colorful of the two characters.  But it should be noted that the model of mono-
polistic competition that has survived in countless textbooks is that of Chamberlin, not Robinson‘s.  This is the fa-
miliar graphical analysis in which the short run equilibrium of a monopolistically competitive firm potentially re-
sults in economic profit, but with free entry the long run equilibrium produces a tangency of the firm‘s demand 
curve with the downward-sloping portion of its long run average cost curve.
3
  The graphic depiction of long run 
equilibrium is reproduced in the appendix.  This tangency results in only normal profit and in excess capacity.   
 
As appropriately described in a leading History of Thought text (Landreth and Colander, 1994), ―Chamber-
lin‘s work, though similar to Robinson‘s, was more far reaching.  It attempted a thorough reconstruction of the 
theory of value.‖  While Chamberlin viewed a competitive process as taking place within his model, hence the long-
run dimension to his model, Robinson did not.  In Robinson‘s perspective, there is no competing away of monopoly 
profits.  Chamberlin developed an expansive analysis of product differentiation and of advertising whereas Robinson 
did not.  What Robinson (1933, pp. 292-299) did do, that Chamberlin did not, was to interpret imperfect competition 
as by definition resulting in the exploitation of labor, i.e., the payment to labor of a wage less than its marginal prod-
uct.  In her analysis the fact that a firm faces an upward sloping supply curve of labor results in exploitation.  Ama-
zingly, Robinson points out that an upward slope may result from the supply being limited by geography.  But this 
circumstance would normally improve the position of labor, so it is ironic that Robinson would label this situation as 
one of ―exploitation‖, for which she recommended imposition of a legal or collectively bargained minimum as a 
cure.  However, Chamberlin (1936) quite correctly demonstrated that in imperfect competition, all factors are in this 
sense ―exploited‖ so that this particular definition of exploitation is a meaningless concept.  As for Chamberlin be-
ing a ―one idea‖ man, it should be noted that Chamberlin is the originator of the sub-field of Experimental Econom-
ics, for which the 2002 Nobel Prize was awarded to Vernon Smith for his modern development and advancement of 
the sub-field.  In an interview with Reason, Smith indicates that his interest in developing the experimental approach 
to economics was motivated when he was a student of Chamberlin‘s and was subjected to his experiments.4  In fact, 
Chamberlin‘s ―An Experimental Imperfect Market‖ (1948) is often cited as the seminal article in Experimental Eco-
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nomics by its current practitioners.  Chamberlin‘s early use of the method has spawned further applications that have 
provided insights far removed from the topic of imperfect competition—voting models being one such example.5  
 
Another sub-area of economics where Edward Chamberlin had immense influence is in what is commonly 
called Spatial Economics – the modern development of location theory in Regional Economics.6  It does not exagge-
rate to say that modern location theory for the most part simply extends Chamberlin‘s analysis of product differen-
tiation in monopolistic competition to the case of differential location, wherein neither perfect competition nor pure 
monopoly models have any applicability or yield any insights.  Chamberlin may rightfully be regarded as the inspi-
ration of modern Industrial Organization Economics, with its emphasis on the conduct-structure-performance para-
digm and its characterization of industry types.  
 
Further, Chamberlin‘s two-curve model of demand forms the basis of Paul Sweezy‘s model of price rigidi-
ty under oligopoly – a model that for years pervaded textbooks from the principles level upward.  Since the model 
no longer tends to be regarded as useful it perhaps cannot be counted as a long-lasting contribution for which Cham-
berlin is given credit by inspiration.  But in the same vein, most of Robinson‘s contributions outside of imperfect 
competition, from Keynesian growth models to labor market monopsony, no longer enjoy much currency.  So it is a 
debatable point as to who had the greater lasting influence.   
 
After the 1933 edition, subsequent editions of Chamberlin‘s Theory of Monopolistic Competition addressed 
some of the criticisms of the first edition, and such responses continued through the eighth and final edition.  Despite 
Chamberlin‘s attempts to engage Robinson in debate over their different perspectives, she largely chose to ignore 
him. Her means for doing so was to assert that when she and Chamberlin were talking about the same problems, 
they came to the same conclusions – and when they didn‘t come to the same conclusion it was because they were 
talking about different problems.  Long after the first publication of their theories, Robinson (1960, p. 222) said: ―I 
should like to take this opportunity of saying that I have never been able to grasp the nature of the distinction be-
tween imperfect and monopolistic competition to which Professor Chamberlin attaches so much importance.‖7  
What was not different between them was their assessment of the inadequacy and inapplicability of the model of 
perfect competition.  Chamberlin saw virtually all markets as having elements of monopoly and competition, but did 
not see this condition as a market failure.  Robinson, on the contrary, tended to see every departure from perfect 
competition as a nail in the intellectual coffin of free market capitalism.   
 
3.  Chamberlin’s Critics 
 
While Chamberlin had many critics in his time, the technical criticisms of his model are not the major con-
cern of this paper. While some are fairly straightforward, others are quite complex and an elaboration of them is 
beyond the scope of this discussion.  To briefly summarize, critics often found the greatest difficulty in accepting 
either or both of (a) the concept of product differentiation combined with free entry or (b) the implication of the 
―tangency conclusion‖ that monopolistically competitive firms will have excess capacity even in long run equili-
brium.  Nicholas Kaldor‘s well-known criticism in large measure involved both.  More directly, Kaldor (1935, 1938) 
had difficulty seeing any difference between monopolistic competition, as exposited by Chamberlin, and perfect 
competition.
8
  His difficulty is connected to the free entry condition with which Chamberlin characterized monopo-
listic competition.  With free entry, Kaldor reasoned, rival firms could enter not only with close substitutes but with 
identical products.  Apparently Kaldor, like most economists of the day, could not break themselves away from the 
Marshallian mode of thinking that saw everything traded as homogeneous commodities without the characteristics 
of brand loyalty, quality differentials, heterogeneous consumer perceptions and idiosyncratic services.  In this mode, 
an industry is clearly defined.  In contrast, Chamberlin‘s perception was more in the mode of modern demand theory 
that sees ―commodities‖ as inputs into the production of ―goods‖.  It is the goods that yield utility, and the distinc-
tion between commodities and goods is the basis for the approach of Kevin Lancaster (1971) with regard to con-
sumer behavior and Gary Becker (1965) with regard to the allocation of time.  In this framework as well as Cham-
berlin‘s, the concept of ―industry‖ loses its precision.   
 
Of course to the extent that analysts had difficulty seeing a difference between monopolistic and perfect 
competition they would by definition have difficulty accepting the excess capacity conclusion.  But the reluctance of 
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many economists to accept the excess capacity conclusion was more widespread.  The excess capacity conclusion 
follows from the geometry of Chamberlin, and little in the way of logic.  It is dependent on the firms that compete 
against each other having identical cost structures.  But many critics have pointed out that there is an inconsistency 
between the assumption of heterogeneous products and uniform cost functions.  Others have argued that product 
differentiation needn‘t lead to production on the downward slope of a firm‘s cost curve.  One textbook that suc-
cinctly summarized this perspective was written by Donald Dewey (1975, p. 171): 
 
Consider the case of, say, bubble gum.  Peppermint-flavored sticks and cherry-flavored sticks are the same 
product except for the flavoring imparted to the basic gum at some stage in the production process.  Both types are 
produced with the same fixed investment – machines, skilled workers, warehouses, etc.  Expenditures on flavoring 
fluids to differentiate gum are variable costs.  There is no reason to believe that gum will be produced where aver-
age total cost is falling simply because the industry produces different flavors. …It follows that if the cost of diffe-
rentiating a commodity from its close substitutes is to constitute a barrier to efficient production, this cost must be a 
fixed cost.  The technology used to manufacture an air-cooled automobile engine is from that used to produce a wa-
ter-cooled automobile engine.  Each type requires its own specialized tools and dies.  Hence if the economy pro-
duced both types of engine, it is possible that each type will be produced in a plant where average total cost is fall-
ing.  Can we say that the existence of two such plants …is evidence of “excess capacity”?  Obviously not.  
…[P]roviding there is no cheaper way to produce the particular mix of …engines that is offered on the market, 
there is no excess capacity. 
 
   The excess capacity via tangency conclusion can be disputed on even simpler grounds.  For one, in the real 
world empirically measured costs seem to have a wide range of relatively flat marginal and total cost curves, unlike 
the typical textbook depictions.  As a consequence, the tangency-induced excess capacity, while not moot, is of little 
practical significance.  Further, as Murray Rothbard (1993, p. 643-4) has pointed out, the tangency solution rests on 
the assumption of continuous demand and cost functions. These are convenient for mathematical derivation, but at 
odds with the real world that is characterized by discrete functions. Even more fundamentally, Roy Harrod (1952, 
p.149), in anticipation of a rational expectations argument, pointed out the irrationality assumed in alleging that a 
firm‘s managers, knowing that market conditions will force them to produce one level of output as dictated by the 
tangency solution, would then choose to build a plant of a size that is optimal for a higher level of production.   
 
More recent criticisms of the excess capacity conclusion are more complex.  The ―contestable markets‖ li-
terature spawned by William Baumol and colleagues essentially concludes that free entry and exit is sufficient to 
negate excess capacity in less that perfectly competitive firms.
9
 It is easy to see a connection between the concept of  
―contestable markets‖ and that of ―Workable Competition‖ fostered much earlier by John Maurice Clark (1940).  
One of the leading Institutional Economists of the 20
th
 century, Clark took the position that in many if not most in-
dustries, potential rivalry would be sufficient to reduce the difference between the efficiency of monopolistic vs. 
perfect competition (including the matter of capacity use) to such a small matter of degree that public policy need 
not address the difference.  Moreover, Clark was in agreement with Chamberlin that the model of perfect competi-
tion, besides having little connection with the real world, should not be the norm that should form the basis for pub-
lic policy—particularly antitrust policy (Clark, 1957, 158-156).  The use of the model of perfect competition as an 
ideal structure toward which public policy should be aimed is further discussed below. 
 
Further, Greenhut, Norman and Hung (1987, chapter 19) have demonstrated that under conditions of uncer-
tainty (and with the existence of a return to entrepreneurial uncertainty) excess capacity is not possible in equili-
brium.
10
  The emphasis that his contemporaries put on the tangency solution was a source of irritation to Chamber-
lin.  Ironically, it was and still is the most prominent feature that the economics profession has taken from Chamber-
lin‘s work.  Despite the attractiveness of this feature to many in the profession, Chamberlin in later editions and in 
other forums put this irritation in print.
11
  One difficulty that many in the profession had with monopolistic competi-
tion as adding anything more than descriptive accuracy to the understanding of markets had to do with the definition 
of a market.  Chamberlin did not talk of market equilibria, but rather of group equilibria.  The group was a collection 
of firms producing non-identical but closely related products.  By ―closely related‖ Chamberlin meant having high 
elasticities of substitution, but such elasticity is a relative matter.  As Chamberlin himself pointed out, all goods are 
substitutes for one another, varying only by degree.  But this fact makes the dividing line of the group indeterminate.  
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In short, acceptance of Chamberlin‘s theory would destroy the (seemingly) clear conception of a market or industry 
embedded in economic theory by Marshall.  Moreover, in doing so monopolistic competition is rendered incompati-
ble with general equilibrium theory, to which the profession is enamored.  To many, this inconsistency substantially 
limited the value of Chamberlin‘s contribution. To others this inconsistency was merely a fact that had to be lived 
with, and simply limited the scope of applicability of the theory to partial equilibrium problems, e.g., Robert Triffin 
(1940).  
 
While there unquestionably were significant technical problems with the theory of imperfect competition, it 
must be said that Chamberlin‘s inability to foster the complete transformation of microeconomic theory he envi-
sioned does not so much stem from these technical problems.  Criticism from the Chicago School, though late in 
materializing, remains the most influential as it went to the heart of the methodological foundation of the concept of 
monopolistic competition.  In particular, the methodological positivist approach of Milton Friedman (1953) takes as 
one of its central propositions that a theory must explain a wide range of phenomena, and this necessitates the estab-
lishment of inherently unrealistic assumptions.  But it is not the realism or lack of it in a theory‘s assumptions by 
which that theory should be judged, but rather by the accuracy of its explanations or predictions.  By this standard, 
Friedman and methodologically like-minded economists have deemed Chamberlin‘s model of monopolistic compe-
tition to be a failure, adding nothing to what is understood by reference to the polar models of perfect competition 
and pure monopoly.  On monopolistic competition specifically, Friedman says (on pages 15 and 39): 
 
The development of this analysis was explicitly motivated, and its wide acceptance and approval largely 
explained, by the belief that the assumptions of “perfect competition” or “perfect monopoly” said to underlie neoc-
lassical economic theory are a false image of reality.  And this belief was itself based almost entirely on the directly 
perceived descriptive inaccuracy of the assumptions rather than on any recognized contradiction of the predictions 
derived from neoclassical economic theory. …  
 
The theory of monopolistic competition offers no tools for the analysis of an industry and so no stopping 
place between the firm at one extreme and general equilibrium at the other.  It is therefore incompetent to contribute 
to the analysis of a host of important problems: the one extreme is too narrow to be of great interest; the other, too 
broad to permit meaningful generalizations. 
 
The methodological positivism of the Chicago school remains the conventional doctrine of the neoclassical 
economics mainstream, although most in that mainstream of course do not totally dismiss Chamberlin‘s contribu-
tion.
12
  But among many associated with the Chicago School, the rejection remains rather complete.
13
  For example 
the once popular price theory texts of Friedman (1976) and George Stigler (1987) make no mention of either mono-
polistic competition or Edward Chamberlin.   
 
4.  Monopolistic Competition And Economic Welfare 
 
 Whatever one‘s conclusions about the various critiques of Chamberlin‘s contribution by his ―enemies‖, the 
more baffling to Chamberlin must have been the assessments by his ―friends‖.  By ―friends‖ we mean those econo-
mists who accepted his model along with the excess capacity conclusion, and from it drew the now standard conclu-
sion of the inefficiency of monopolistic competition.  That Edward Chamberlin objected to the welfare implications 
inferred by his followers is a fact that seems to be lost to history.  Modern textbooks either treat the excess capacity 
conclusion as evidence in itself of welfare loss, (i.e., a violation of the conditions for Pareto optimality) or allow for 
the possibility that against the inefficiency in production must be weighed the gain to consumers that in some cir-
cumstances may accrue from product variety.  But this latter effect is almost never attributed to Chamberlin him-
self.
14
  Yet Chamberlin expressed his dissent in print repeatedly, including in subsequent editions of Monopolistic 
Competition, but in no place more emphatically than at a session of an annual meeting of the American Economics 
Association (Chamberlin, 1950).
15
  On page 85, he states: 
 
 I must again lament the widespread misunderstanding of the subject [of monopolistic competition]; so that 
what has been “conquered” [in terms of the widespread acceptance of the model] appears to be something quite 
contrary to the theory, at least as I understand it. …The supremacy of pure competition with its corollary of prices 
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equal to marginal costs as the economic welfare ideal is well known. …What is perhaps not so well appreciated is 
how explicitly monopolistic competition has been interpreted as merely indicating the nature of the departures from 
the ideal which need to be corrected. …The main point I want to make is that the welfare ideal itself (as well as the 
description of reality) involves a blend of monopoly and competition and is therefore correctly described as one of 
monopolistic competition.   
 
 Of course, the tangency solution that is characteristic of the model of monopolistic competition is the facet 
of Chamberlin‘s model that leads to the excess capacity and consequent welfare loss conclusion to which Chamber-
lin objects.  As already mentioned, Chamberlin expressed irritation about what he regarded as excess emphasis on 
excess capacity.  But he never disavowed excess capacity as a characteristic of monopolistic competition. Obviously 
then, his reluctance to accept the conclusion that a welfare loss necessarily followed from the existence of monopo-
listic competition was not based on a denial of excess capacity.  Before continuing with Chamberlin‘s critique of 
what we have called his ―friends‖ however, it should be pointed out that downward-sloping demand curves result in 
general excess capacity (that is, excess capacity for all firms in a Chamberlinian group) only when the cost curves of 
all firms in the group are identical.  Otherwise, only the highest cost firm necessarily will have excess capacity.  
Other firms may have excess capacity, or ―insufficient‖ capacity – no generalization is possible.  Importantly, even 
under perfect competition, as long as firms do not have identical cost curves, the usual conclusion of all firms in 
long run equilibrium operating at ideal (minimum cost) capacity does not hold.
16
  The welfare implication is a nega-
tive one—that is, there is no basis for assuming that monopolistic competition is less efficient than perfect competi-
tion.
17
  Though this is not the approach taken by Chamberlin, it arrives at the same conclusion – perfect competition 
is not the welfare ideal against which the real world of monopolistic competition should be compared and not the 
ideal toward which public policy should aim.   
 
 Returning to Chamberlin (1950, p. 86), he describes human beings as by their nature diverse, as well as 
spatially separated, and these facts in themselves should lead to entrepreneurs appealing to these diverse demands 
with heterogeneous products.  And if diversity is what consumers want, and consumer wants supposedly form the 
basis of welfare, then a correct measure of welfare would incorporate this truth into construction of the welfare 
ideal. Chamberlin then (p. 87) contrasts this perspective to the perspective one can deduce from Joan Robinson and 
others, wherein product heterogeneity is an artificial contrivance of producers that works to the detriment of con-
sumers.  Chamberlin goes on to attack (p. 88) the notion that product differentiation is attributable to imperfect 
knowledge, ―as though the individuality of particular products could be dismissed as an optical illusion based on 
ignorance – a purely psychic phenomenon.‖  According to Chamberlin, there is as much reason to believe that per-
fect information would result in stronger recognition of the differences in products as in their similarities, and that 
this would manifest itself in the market by the demand curves for individual producers becoming less, not more, 
elastic.  In a similar vein, Chamberlin then minimizes the criticism of product heterogeneity as being the result of 
irrational preferences.  And on page 89, he responds to the tendency to view preferences for differentiated products 
as irrational because they are influenced by advertising, adding: ―The general condemnation of advertising as a 
waste surely has its primary explanation in the irrelevancy that it could not exist under the perfectly competitive 
ideal.‖  Indeed, Kenneth Boulding in his very successful Economic Analysis (1966) the 1st edition of which was pub-
lished in 1941, after condemning most advertising as wasteful, says just that in a section headed ―No Competitive 
Advertising under Perfect Competition‖.  Also on page 89, Chamberlin argues that while it is true that in monopolis-
tic competition firms do not operate on the low point of their average cost curves, and in this sense might be ―ineffi-
cient‖ (as it is by definition in welfare economics), product differentiation can not be said to reduce economic wel-
fare unless it can be shown that the loss of efficiency in this sense is somehow greater than the gain in consumer 
utility.  He argued that the inability of welfare economics to incorporate this and other aspects of monopolistic com-
petition indicates the inadequacy of modern welfare economics, not of the theory of monopolistic competition.  
Chamberlin concludes (p. 92) as follows: 
 
Thus, wherever there is a demand for diversity of product, pure competition turns out to be not the ideal but 
a departure from it.  Marginal cost pricing no longer holds as a principle of welfare economics …nor is the mini-
mum point on the cost curve for the firm to be associated with the ideal.  Selling costs may no longer be excluded 
from the problem or dismissed as an obvious waste; yet the impossibility of discovering from the standard welfare 
techniques what is the socially ideal expenditure on selling suggests that the techniques are unduly narrow. …What 
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has been called the “new welfare economics,” instead of being on a “secure basis” …has quite misconceived a 
whole set of major problems.  It is badly in need of a general overhauling. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
 Nowhere does Chamberlin distinctly state that the degree of product diversity generated in the market 
would be provably ideal (Pareto optimal).  His point was that general equilibrium theory and welfare economics, as 
they stood half a century ago, could not shed any light on the matter.  But if his model of monopolistic competition 
were incompatible with general equilibrium and welfare economics, it not only was because of the limitations and 
inadequacies of welfare economics, but also the false notion of the existence of a Marshallian industry demand 
curve that persists today.  The latter persists because it tells a neat and formal story that fits so well into the general 
equilibrium construct that economists so admire, irrespective of the fact that it doesn‘t exist in a real world of prod-
uct differentiation by degree.   
 
A half-century later, the inadequacy of which Chamberlin complained remains.  Graduate students in Eco-
nomics are taught all of the mechanics of welfare statics, and perfect competition is still presented as the ideal.  The 
various ways in which the real world departs from this ideal are catalogued, e.g., externalities and public goods, mo-
nopoly, and – in more advanced discussions – opportunism, moral hazard, asymmetric information etc.  All of these 
exercises provide valuable insights.  Arguably, there is no better pedagogical device for making students aware of 
the complexity of the interrelationships that exist in the real world, but which are necessarily ignored in partial equi-
librium analysis.  But seldom in such expositions is the technique of welfare economics itself called into question 
and its severe limitations examined.  The one exception has to do with the fact that the technique cannot identify any 
particular wealth distribution as a welfare ideal.  Arguably, this is the least consequential inadequacy of welfare eco-
nomics but it stems from the disconnect in welfare theory (but not in the real world) between exchange and produc-
tion on the one hand and the personal distribution of wealth on the other.  Moreover, there has been little in the way 
of attempts to reconstruct Paretian welfare economics in such a way as to recognize and incorporate the utility pro-
ducing aspects of product heterogeneity.  It is noteworthy that the classics on general equilibrium and welfare have 
tended either to simply ignore product heterogeneity (e.g., Quirk and Saposnik, 1968), or discuss it tangentially 
(e.g., Scitovsky, 1951).  The only differentiation that Kuenne (1963) entertained is with regard to spatial differentia-
tion.  One exception that nonetheless does not seem to have influenced the way economists have treated hetero-
geneity is Lancaster (1975).  In a model based on his influential ―characteristics approach‖ to consumer demand 
theory (1971), Lancaster concludes that (a) there is a socially optimal degree of product differentiation; and (b) it is 
not possible in the real world to identify what would be this optimal degree (1975, p. 584).
18
   
 
It is of course not only the Chamberlinian perspective that is a square peg that can‘t be fit into the round 
hole of modern welfare economics with its static ideal of perfect competition—so too is the perspective of Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942).   Schumpeter always regarded perfect competition as an exceedingly imperfect ideal that, if it 
could be attained, would be antithetical to the entire process of innovation and economic progress.  Schumpeter died 
before completing his massive History of Economic Analysis (1954).  Despite a dozen very brief references to 
Chamberlin, Schumpeter, though he intended to do so, never got around to giving a complete assessment of the 
Chamberlin model.  Chamberlin (1951), however, considered his perspective completely compatible with that of 
Schumpeter.  One contemporary of theirs who also saw them as compatible, and who also shared Chamberlin‘s 
perspective on the implications of product diversity for consumer welfare, was Alex Hunter (1955).  But on the lat-
ter concern, he appears to have been very much in the minority.  Both Schumpeter and Chamberlin dealt with the 
dynamics of market processes, which are not easily treated in formal equilibrium models.  However, Chamberlin is 
today given nowhere near the recognition for doing so as Schumpeter.  It is an interesting exercise to speculate as to 
why this is so.  Perhaps it is because Schumpeter never attempted to formalize his story, whereas Chamberlin not 
only did attempt to formalize his story but did so in the only way economists of his day formalized anything – that 
is, in static equilibrium terms.  In an interview, Brian Loasby has attested to the fact that Chamberlin was primarily 
concerned with market processes, and viewed the activities of monopolistic competitors as part of the discovery 
process that today is the focus of modern Austrian School economists.
19
  Thus, a reinterpretation and reevaluation of 
Chamberlin may well be in order.  In light of all that economists have learned in the last half-century, such a reeval-
uation may well raise the esteem in which Chamberlin is held.   




1. See ―Edward H. Chamberlin, 1899-1967‖ http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/chamberlin.htm and ―Joan 
Violet Robinson, 1903-1983‖ http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/robinson.htm. 
2. The reference to the ―unremarkable book‖ is Chamberlin (1957). 
3. It should be noted, however, that Chamberlin did not employ the terms ―Marginal Revenue‖ and ―Marginal 
Cost‖ that are abbreviated in the graph shown in the appendix.  The use of these terms originates with Ro-
binson. 
4. This interview is available online at: http://www.reason.com/0212/fe.ml.the.shtml.  Interestingly, Smith 
attributes his attraction to the experimental method to dissatisfaction with Chamberlin‘s conclusions. 
5. See the Southern Economic Association 2002 Presidential Address of Charles Holt (2003). 
6. Chamberlin recognized the locational dimension of product differentiation and his approach was greatly 
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